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BACKGROUND EVIDENCE IN MURDER CASES
JOEL F. HANDLER
The author is Assistant to the Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the judicial
Conference of the United States, Professor Benjamin Kaplan of the Harvard Law School. Previously,
Mr. Handler served as Law Secretary to Justice Nathan L. Jacobs of the New Jersey Supreme Court
and as a teaching fellow at the Harvard Law School. He is a law graduate, magna cum laude, of Har-
vard, where he was an editor of the law review.
In capital cases today, jurors frequently perform two functions: in a single verdict they not only
decide the question of guilt but also, where guilt is found, they assess the punishment. In this article,
Mr. Handler tackles the troublesome question whether evidence concerning the defendant's back-
ground, relevant solely to the issue of aggravation or mitigation of punishment, should be placed
before the jury during the trial, thus risking jury utilization of punishment-oriented evidence in
resolving the precedent question of guilt. The author analyzes the numerous and often conflicting
cases, discusses the California and Pennsylvania statutes which provide for a separate jury trial on the
issue of punishment, and then suggests a solution which he believes will encourage the presentation
of background evidence and at the same time prevent convictions based upon the "bad man" theory.
With relatively minor exceptions,' the function
of the jury in the non-capital criminal case is
restricted to the determination of the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused. The evidence that the
jury receives, in the performance of its duty, is
limited in the following manner: the evidence must
be relevant to guilt or innocence; and, even though
it is relevant and does not violate any other ex-
clusionary rule, it nonetheless may be excluded if
its potentiality for prejudice is too great, or if it
may cause a confusion of issues or unfair surprise.2
It is the task of the sentencing judge to fix the
punishment, and, for obvious reasons, the infor-
mation that the sentencing judge receives has
none of the above limitations. It is usually pro-
vided by statute that the judge receive a pre-
sentence report, 3 which, if properly prepared, will
cover the entire background of the defendant.
The aim of the report is to bring before the judge
all of the facts of the life of the defendant pertinent
to the purposes of criminal punishment.4
In the capital case the function of the jury has
been changed. Aside from the eight states which
have abolished the death penalty,5 all of the states
ISee, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-2145, 2306 (1947);
IND. STAT. ANN. §9-1819 (Burns 1956).
2 See McCoRmCK, EVIDENCE ch. 16, 17 (1954).3 E.g., FED. R. Ciurm P. 32 (c); N. J. RuLEs 3:10
(b); cf. N. Y. CODE CRIr. PROC. §931.
4 See State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 183, 142 A.2d
65, 79 (1958) (concurring opinion).
5 AAsxA Con. LAWS ANN. §65-411 (Cum. Supp.
1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §571 (1953); ME. REv.
now provide an alternate penalty for first-degree
murder.6 And, in all but two of these states,7 the
STAT. c. 130, §1 (1954); Mica. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§28.548 (1938); MnN. STAT. ANN. §619.07 (1947);
N. D. REv. CODE §12-2713 (1943) ("If a person shall
be convicted of murder in the first degree while under
a life sentence upon a conviction of murder in the first
degree, he may be punished by death."); R. I. GEN.
LAWS §11-23-2 (1957) ("Every person who shall
commit murder while under sentence of imprisonment
for life shall be hanged by the neck until dead."); Wis.
STAT. ANN. ch. 940.01 (1958).
6 ALA. CODE fit. 14, §318 (1940) (automatic death
if murder committed while serving a life term); Amiz.
STAT. ANN. §13-453 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§41-
2227 43-2153 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE §190 (Deering
1941); CoLo. REv. STAT. §40-2-3 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. tit. 53-10 (1958); FLA. STAT. §§782.04, 919.23(1)
(2) (1944); GA. CODE AN. §26-1005 (1953); HAWAn
Rxv. LAWS §291-1, 3, 5 (1955); IDAHo CODE §18-4004(1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §360 (1935); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§10-3401, 9-1819 (Burns 1956); IOWA CODE
§§690.2, 690.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21-403(1949); Ky. REv. STAT. §§431.130, 435.010 (1948);
LA. REV. STAT. fit. 14, §30, tit. 15, §409 (1951); MD.
ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 27, §413 (1957); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 265, §2 (1959) (automatic death if
murder was "committed in connection with the com-
mission of rape or attempt to commit rape"); Miss.
CODE ANN. §2217 (1946) (court must fix punishment
at imprisonment for life if the jury is unable to agree
on the punishment); Mo. STAT. ANN. §559.030 (1953);
MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. §94-2505 (1947) (same pro-
vision as Mississippi, supra); NEB. STAT., 1947, c. 91,
§121; N. H. REv. LAWS C. 585.4 (1955); N. J. STAT.
ANN. tit. 2A, c. 113, §§2, 4 (1953); N. M. STAT. ANN.
§40-24-10 (1953); N. Y. PENAL LAW §§1045, 1045a
(1944); N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-17 (1953); Onmo REv.
CODE ANN. §2901.01 (1954); OKLA. STAT. AaN. 21:
707 (1958); 0RE. REv. STAT. 163.010 (1957); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (Purdon 1959); S. C. CODE §16-52
JOEL F. HANDLER
responsibility of determining life or death has
been shifted to the jury. California and Pennsyl-
vania excepted,8 in the states where the jury is
required to fix the penalty, the jury must determine
guilt or innocence and punishment in a single ver-
dict. In view of this additional function, the prob-
lem of whether background evidence, relevant
solely to punishment, should be presented to the
jury in the single-verdict situation has been trou-
bling commentators 9 and courts 0 alike. The experi-
(1952); S. D. CODE OF 1939, Supp. 13.2012 (1952);
TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2405 (1955); TEx. PENAL CODE
c. 16, art. 1257 (1948); UTAe CODE ANN. §76-30-4
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §2303 (1958) (auto-
matic death for an "unrelated second offense"); VA.
CODE tit. 18, §31, tit. 19, §223 (1950); WASH. Rv.
CODE tit. 9, §9.48.030 (1957); W. VA. CODE OF 1955
ANN. §§5917, 6204; Wyo. STAT., 1957, §6-54; 18 U.
S. C. §§454, 567 (1946).
7 In New York and Utah the jury recommendation
is not binding on the trial court. See statutes cited
note 6 supra. In some states the appellate court can
modify the jury verdict on punishment. See, e.g., State
v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279 (1921); An-
thony v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 494, 159 Pac. 934 (1916);
and see, generally, Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sen-
tences on Appeal I, 37 COLum. L. REv. 521, 530 (1937).
In South Dakota the trial court may disregard a ver-
dict of death and impose life imprisonment, but a jury
verdict of life imprisonment is binding. See statute
cited note 6 supra.
8 CAL. PENAL CODE §190.01 (Deering 1957 Pocket
Supp.): "The guilt or innocence of every person charged
with an offense for which the penalty is in the alterna-
tive death or imprisonment for life shall first be de-
termined, without a finding as to penalty. If such
person has been found guilty of an offense punishable
by life imprisonment or death, there shall thereupon
be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the
trier of fact shall fix the penalty.... The determination
of the penalty shall be in the discretion of the court orjury trying the issue of fact on the evidence
presented ..... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (Purdon
1959): "In the trial of an indictment for murder, the
court shall inform the jury that if they find the de-
fendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it will be
their further duty to fix the penalty therefor, after
hearing such additional evidence as may be submitted
upon that question. Whenever the jury shall agree upon
a verdict of murder in the first degree, they shall im-
mediately return and render the same, which shall be
recorded, and shall not thereafter be subject to recon-
sideration by the jury, or any member thereof. After
such verdict is recorded and before the jury is per-
mitted to separate, the court shall proceed to receive
such additional evidence not previously received in the
trial as may be relevant and admissible upon the ques-
tion of the penalty to be imposed upon the defendant,
and shall permit such argument by counsel, and deliver
such charge thereon as may be just and proper in the
circumstances."
'IE.g., REPORT, ROYAL COMU. ON CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 194-207 (1953); A. L. I., MODEL PENAL CODE
§210.6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Knowlton, Prob-
lems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 1099 (1953); Hayden, Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 105, 124 (1958); 29 J.
Cnn. L. & C. 883 (1939).
10 Compare State v. Mount, 30 N. J. 195, 152 A.
ences in California and Pennsylvania prior to their
statutory solutions illustrate the fluctuating atti-
tudes that exist even within a single jurisdiction.
At an early date, the California court, in People
v. Atheron,ii held that the circumstances of the
crime were relevant to the issue of punishment,
and for that reason, should be considered by the
jury. After citing the statutory power of the jury
to determine punishment, the court said: "In
determining between these penalties juries should
be, and doubtless are, influenced by the degree of
atrocity with which the particular murder has
been attended."12 The trial court's instruction was
premised on the fact that what was involved was a
bald assassination as distinguished from an equal
combat. The Supreme Court held that the instruc-
tion would be proper if there was evidence to sup-
port it; the alternate-penalty statute did not intend
that the fair combatant suffer the same penalty
as the assassin. Six years later, in People v. Hong
Ah Duck, 3 the prosecution was permitted to intro-
duce evidence that the accused was presently
serving a term of life imprisonment. In affirming
the ruling, the court was careful to point out that
the evidence was not "offered as affecting in any
manner the question of defendant's guilt" and the
jury was so instructed. It was offered solely on
the question of punishment; its object was to in-
form the jury that if they fixed the punishment at
life imprisonment there would be no addition to
defendant's punishment. The court said: "In order
to exercise that discretion [on the issue of punish-
ment] in a wise and intelligent manner, the jury
should be put in possession of all the facts of the
case; and if it be true, as it was in respect to this
defendant, that a verdict fixing the punishment at
imprisonment for life, would in effect be no punish-
ment at all, we think it was proper to inform the
jury, of that fact.' 4
The decisions in Atherton and Hong Ah Duck
permitted the introduction of evidence in aggrava-
tion of the penalty in the sense that the purpose
of such evidence was to influence the jury in favor
of the death penalty. When it came time for the
defendants to introduce background evidence in
mitigation of punishment, the California courts
became restrictive. The leading decision is People
2d 343 (1959) with Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App.
298, 197 N.E. 214 (1935).
"151 Cal. 495 (1876).12Id. at 496.
13 61 Cal. 387 (1882); accord, People v. Hall, 199
Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859 (1926).
14 People v. Hong Ah Duck, supra at 393.
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v. Wilt,'5 decided in 1915. In that case, appellant,
the non-killing member of a burglary team, un-
successfully attempted to introduce evidence of
his character and previous habits. He argued that
"inasmuch as the jury had the right to assess the
pfinishment in the event of conviction at either
death or life imprisonment appellant was entitled
to have admitted for their consideration evidence
as to matters not otherwise relevant or material"'
6
to the issue of guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed
the refusal of the trial court on the ground that
the determination of the punishment by the jury
must be based "solely on such evidence as is ad-
missible on the issue made by the indictment or
information and plea of the defendant."' 7
Following the Witt decision, the court disallowed
the introduction of evidence that the defendant
was more susceptible to "blinding passion" because
he had suffered a fairly recent sunstroke.1 8 But,
two years later, in 1925, the court in People v.
Perry,19 allowed the defendant to introduce a very
broad range of evidence tending to prove mental
weakness short of legal insanity.n This decision
was overruled sub silentio three years later in
People v. Trockeh which held that the jury must
decide the question of punishment solely on the
evidence relevant to guilt or innocence, and "the
circumstances connected with the offense.""2 In
1934 the court articulated an approach contrary
to Witt and Troche. In People v. Larrios" the trial
court excluded evidence that the defendant was on
a peaceful mission at the time he encountered the
1 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915).
16Id. at 110, 148 Pac. at 930.
'7Id. at 111, 148 Pac. at 930.18 People v. Golsh, 63 Cal. App. 609, 219 Pac. 456
(1923).
10 195 Cal. 623, 234 Pac. 890 (1925).
20 None of the defendants claimed insanity. On be-
half of defendant Montijo, the following evidence was
introduced: five psychologists testified as to his mental
deficiency; his father related the defendant's life story
during which he recalled an injury to the boy's head,
his incorrigibility as a youth, reformatory commitment,
occasional nervous seizures and mental peculiarities. It
was also shown that the defendant was a narcotics
user, and there was expert testimony that his intel-
lectual quotient, as gauged by the Binet-Simon test,
was no higher than a normal 11 year old. The defense
claimed error because the jury was instructed on legal
insanity. The court held this not to be erroneous be-
cause "the right of the jury.., to consider mental
weakness as a mitigating circumstance was not in-
fringed in the slightest degree by anything said in the
instructions." Id. at 639-40, 234 Pac. at 897.21206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767 (1928).
12 See also People v. Valenzuela, 7 Cal.2d 650, 63
P.2d 142 (1936); bul cf. People v. Selph, 106 Cal. App.
704, 289 Pac. 918 (1930).
"220 Cal. 236, 30 P.2d 404 (1934).
deceased. By way of dictum, the Supreme Court
said that even though the evidence had no direct
bearing on the homicide, "a person on trial for his
life should, as against technical objections, be
permitted to state, within reasonable limitations,
something of his background."' ' But any liberaliza-
tion that the Larrios court might have intended
was snuffed out in the decision of People v. French.'5
In that case the court held that evidence of a long
and exceedingly bitter family feud, tending to
show mental derangement short of legal insanity,
cannot be considered by the jury in mitigation of
punishment. The court re-affirmed the rigid ap-
proach of the Witt-Troche line. There was a strong
dissent which argued that it was a denial of due
process to require the jury to fix the penalty in
ignorance of any facts which relate to the com-
mission of the crime other than those which show
the circumstances connected with the offense.'6
In summing up these decisions, the court, in
People v. Barclay,27 stated the rule in California as
follows: evidence of good or bad habits and back-
ground is generally inadmissible, but the jury may
consider the facts and circumstances of the offense
itself. The line between the two is far from clear;
this is especially so when the court cites the Perry
case in support of the rule restricting the jury to a
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the
offense itself.28 When one compares the decision in
Hong Ah Duck, which has been followed, 29 allowing
the introduction of the fact that the accused is
serving a life term, with Witt, Troche, and French,
the California rule works unfairly to the defendant.
A legislative solution was passed in 1956 providing
for two separate trials. The jury is first to consider
the question of guilt; if the defendant is found
guilty, there is to be a second trial on the question
of punishment. At the second trial evidence both
in aggravation and mitigation of punishment may
be introduced.5
Pennsylvania took a different approach. In
mitigation of punishment the defendant was per-
mitted to introduce a wide range of background
evidence including mental deficiency short of legal
2"Id. at 241, 30 P.2d at 405; cf. Pedple v. Pantages,
212 Cal. 237, 297 Pac. 890 (1931).
25 12 Cal.2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014 (1939).
26 Id. at 776, 87 P.2d at 1042.
27 40 Cal.2d 146, 252 P.2d 321 (1953).
28 See also People v. Selph, cited note 22 supra.
21 People v. Hall, cited note 13 supra. Hong Ah Duck
and Hall have been cited with approval in People v.
Barclay, supra at 158, 252 P.2d at 327, and in People
v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 301 P.2d 583, 585 (1956),
cert. den., 355 U.S. 929 (1958).
11 See note 8 supra.
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insanity, early environment, impaired health, in-
toxication, drug addiction, and lack of schooling.3
In aggravation of punishment the prosecution
introduced evidence of prior unrelated crimes.n
The rule seemed simple-admit all evidence rele-
vant to the issue of punishment. Still, the courts of
that state were not without their difficulties. On
mitigation, the court at one time seemed to hold
that the defendant would not be permitted to
introduce background evidence where the crime
was at least in part committed for profit.n But
this limitation apparently disappeared.3 The rule
allowing the introduction of prior unrelated crimes,
not unexpectedly, produced violent dissent. 5 At
31 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391,
65 A. 2d 353, cert. den., 338 U. S. 862 (1949); Common-
wealth v. Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50 A.2d 325 (1947);
Commonwealth v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 169 Atl.
439 (1939); cf. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70,
89 A. 2d 782 (1952), aff'd, 373 Pa. 489,96 A. 2d 122, cert.
den., 345 U.S. 976 (1953); Commonwealth v. Irelan,
341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941); Commonwealth v.
Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 196 At. 5 (1938).
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144,
143 At. 904 (1928); Commonwealth v. Thompson,
389 Pa. 382, 133 A.2d 207, cert. den., 355 U.S. 849
(1957).
13Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 160 Atl.
602 (1932). The defendant attempted to introduce
evidence that "the crime resulted from passion (not
generated at the time the crime was committed),
rather than from a savage and hoplessly antisocial
nature"; that the deceased was an "ill-tempered, fault-
finding degenerate, and that, if defendant was notjustified in killing... [him], society was well rid of
him." Id. at 153, 160 At. at 608. In addition to the
holding stated in the text, the court seemed to imply
that this evidence should be excluded because it tended
to aggravate rather than mitigate punishment. It would
seem, however, that this judgment should be left to
defense counsel.
4 See Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 150
A.2d 863 (1959); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa.
588, 148 A.2d 234 (1959).
35 See, e.g., Musmanno, J., dissenting in Common-
wealth v. Thompson, cited note 32 supra at 429, 133
A.2d at 231: "Now that this Court has apparantly
thrown open the floodgates on all trivial as well as
serious offenses of an accused's past, it is possible for
an innocent man to be sent to the electric chair not on
the evidence of murder but because of the suit of pec-
cadillos which the prosecution forces him to wear. No
other state permits so bizarre and tragic a performance.
Nothing in history since Justinian, nothing in all the
logic of Aristotle, nothing in the mathematics of Euclid,
nothing in the science of Newton or Einstein can justify
so unAmerican, so unjust, and so unreasonable a pro-
cedure." See also Jones, J., dissenting in Common-
wealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A. 2d 649, 659 (1949),
quoted in text at note 88 infra; Biggs, Hastie, and
McLaughlin, J. J., in United States v. Price, 258 F. 2d
918 (3rd Cir.), cert. den., 358 U. S. 922 (1958); Knowl-
ton, cited note 9 supra at 1111; but see McClelland,
Prior Convictions of a Defendant as Evidence in a Crim-
inal Trial in Pennsylvania, 22 Temp. L. Q. 220 (1949).
one point the court began to engraft qualifications.
In Commonwealth v. Williams6 the court limited
the record of prior convictions to those involving
habitual offenders, professional criminals engaged
in crimes for profit, or to murders of a cold
blooded or atrocious nature. Further, "... [Iun no
case should a record of such criminal acts as pick-
pocketry, adultery, embezzling, perjury or others
of a similar nature be used in aggravation of
penalty."37 The limitations were 'later rejected 38
and the law of Pennsylvania, prior to its statutory
reform, was that in aggravation of penalty records
of all prior convictions were admissible even though
the defendant had been placed on probation, or
pardoned, including convictions in a foreign juris-
diction; but proof simply of arrest was not ad-
missible.39 Pennsylvania's statutory reform fol-
lowed the California solution; if there is a finding
of guilty, at the second hearing the court shall
receive such "additional evidence not previously
received in the trial as may be relevant and ad-
missible upon the question of penalty." '39a
Many courts, either in anticipation or the diffi-
culties encountered by California and Pennsyl-
vania, or for other reasons, have refused to permit
the introduction of evidence relevant solely to the
issue of punishment.40 Others, in varying degrees,
have permitted the introduction of the evidence,4'
36 Cited note 33 supra.
17 Id. at 152, 160 Atl. at 608.
38 Commonwealth v. Cannon, 386 Pa. 62, 123 A.2d
675 (1956); Commonwealth v. Thompson, cited note
32 supra at 400, 133 A.2d at 217.
11 See Commonwealth v. Thompson, supra at 400,
133 A.2d at 217 for a collection of the Pennsylvania
decisions.
"'a See note 8 supra.40E.g., Campbell v. Territory, 14 Ariz. 109, 125
Pac. 717 (1912); Goosby v. State, 153 Ga. 496, 112
S.E. 467 (1922); State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254
Pac. 858 (1927); Ashbrook v. State, cited note 10
supra.41E.g., Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603 (1872); Kiersey
v. State, 131 Ark. 487, 199 S.W. 532 (1917); State v.
Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); Nowacryk
v. People, 139 Ill. 336, 28 N.E. 961 (1891); Fletcher v.
People, 117 f11. 184, 7 N.E. 80 (1886); Harris v. Com-
monwealth, 183 Ky. 542, 209 S.W. 509 (1919); State v.
Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940), rev'd on other
grounds, 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 (1941); State, v.
Mount, cited note 10 supra; State v. Brown, 60 Wyo.
379, 151 P.2d 950 (1944). Compare also Common-
wealth v. Hardy, 3 Mass. 278, 290 (1807): "Sewall &
Parker, justices, said that they were not prepared to
say that testimony of general character should be
admitted in behalf of the defendant in all criminal
prosecutions; but they were clearly of the opinion that
it might be admitted in capital cases, in favor of life."
Apparently at this time there was some question as to
whether the accused was permitted to introduce evi-
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but they have failed to articulate and come to
grips with the difficulties encountered when em-
barking on this course of action.
The arguments in favor of the admissibility of
background evidence were forcefully stated in the
early decisions allowing the evidence. In Fields v.
State12 the defendant was not permitted to intro-
duce evidence that the deceased was a violent,
turbulent, revengeful, blood-thirsty, dangerous
man, reckless of human life, and had previously
attacked and publicly abused the defendant. After
discussing the function of the jury at common law,
the Supreme Court said:
"The common law, on this subject, has been
greatly changed by our statutes, and the duties
and responsibilities of juries largely increased;
consequently, evidence that would have been
irrelevant and impertinent at the common law,
becomes proper and necessary, under our stat-
utes, to enable juries to discharge their newly
imp9sed duties rightly and properly.... Al-
though the violence and outrage committed about
the person of the defendant in this case might
not have been sufficient to reduce the offense
from murder to manslaughter, yet, we hold it
was clearly proper for the- consideration of the
jury in determining the turpitude of the punish-
ment to be inflicted."4'
In Fletder v. PeopleM a dispute arose concerning
the grazing of cattle in a particular area. One
Steinbourne, an employee of the deceased, testified
that one of the defendants, Merritt Fletcher, shot
and wounded Steinbourne and shot and killed the
deceased. Subsequent to the trial the parties dis-
covered an affidavit made by Steinbourne prior
to the trial stating that Merritt did not shoot
dence of good character. See 1 WiGmoRE, EvmuscE
§56 (3d ed. 1940).
In Texas, by statute, it is provided that in all pros-
ecutions for felonious homicide "the State or the de-
fendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the
killing and the previous relationship existing between
the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant
facts and circumstances going to show the condition of
the mind of the accused at the time of the homicide,
which may be considered by the jury in determining
the punishment to be assessed." Thx. PEN. CoDe ANN.
art. 1257a (Vernon 1936). The evidence that this paper
is concerned with extends beyond that covered by the
above statute. Compare King v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. R.
508, 243 S.W.2d 846 (1951) and Wiggins v. State, 115
Tex. Cr. R. 434, 27 S.W.2d 236 (1930) with State v.
Henry, State v. Mount, and State v. Owen, supra,
discussed in text at note 50 infra.
42 47 Ala. 603 (1872).
4Id. at 606.
44 Cited note 41 supra.
Steinbourne until after Steinbourne had struck
Merritt's father with a stick and that Merritt did
not shoot the deceased until after the deceased had
thrown Merrit to the ground. The court held that
there must be a new trial because this evidence was
relevant to the question of punishment. After cit-
ing the alternate-penalty statute, the court said:
"It necessarily follows that in order to determine
the degree of punishment to be imposed for this
offense, evidence must be admissible which
would not have been admissible, or, if admitted,
could have availed nothing at common law ....
If Steinboure's attention had been called to
this statement on the trial, and he admitted
that he had made it, and that it was true, it
must have tended to have the effect to put the
conduct of Merritt in a less unfavorable light
before the jury. ... If Merritt... did not
shoot until his father had been struck by Stein-
bourne, his conduct,,-however inexcusable, is
certainly, in a moral point of view,, in some
degree less objectionable than it would have been
if he had shot before. And if he did not shoot
and kill Hope until after Hope had thrown him
on the ground, his act is also, in this respect, in
some degree, however 'slight it may be, less
culpable than it would have been if he had shot
him before when he might without difficulty,
have retreated from the.conflict."4'
In Nowarcryk 'v. PeoplM the defendant was not
permitted to introduce evidence of prior ill feeling
between the defendant and the father of the de-
ceased, and that on the day before the homicide
the father, armed with a knife, went searching
for the defendant with the expressed intention of
killing him. In holding error, the court said:
"The evident design of the [alternate-penalty]
statute is that the punishment shall be propor-
tioned to the turpitude of the offense, and it
follows that evidence having a direct and legiti-
mate bearing upon that question should be
given to the jury, so as to enable them to fix
the punishment understandingly and justly....
[I]t is dear from the evidence that ... the de-
fendant's intention was not to kill her, but to
kill her father. If, then, so late as the day next
previous to that on which the homicide was
committed,... [the father] was in persistent
pursuit of the defendant ... seeking to take his
life ... the act of the defendant in attempting to
45 Id. at 189, 7 N.E. at 83.
46 Cited note 41 supra.
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kill ... [the father] and killing his daughter may
possibly have been regarded by the jury as
manifesting a somewhat less degree of turpitude
than that shown by the offense proven, viz., an
unprovoked assassination.1
47
The idea expressed in the three cases was that
the alternate-penalty statutes for murder imposed
an additional duty on the jury; in order for the
jury to satisfy understandingly and justly that
obligation, it was necessary that it receive evi-
dence relevant to that question. The later deci-
sions, while their expression is somewhat broader,
contain the same idea. "[Tihe purpose... is that
they [the jury] should be able intelligently to fix
the penalty, and, to that end, that they ought to
know what manner of man it is upon whom they
are being asked to impose sentence,-his criminal
proclivities, his demonstrated attitude toward law
and order, and, on the other hand, such mitigating
factors as may exist in the nature of impaired
health, mental deficiencies, state of intoxication,
or other circumstances." 48 The analogy is often
made to the role of the sentencing judge in the
non-capital case, where it is usually required that
he receive a pre-sentence report. Justice Francis,
arguing for the admissibility of evidence of mental
disorder short of legal insanity, drew the analogy
in the following manner:
"In dealing with every type of criminal offense,
a judge fixes the punishment .... However, in
no instance can a judge, no matter how long
his experience in administering the criminal law
or how vast his knowledge of human nature,
sentence a defendant without first obtaining a
presentence report. ... Such reports are pre-
pared by men trained in the field of criminal
responsibility. They range over the entire life
of the offender-his religious training, education,
environment, family life, work habits, medical
history, if any, and the like-in an endeavor to
bring to the mind of the court all of the elements
pertinent to the degree of the punishment and
potentiality for rehabilitation. ... On the basis
of my own experience as a County Court judge,
I do not believe that adequate or just sentences
can be meted out without such investigations. 49
On the basis of this reasoning a broad variety
of background evidence has been allowed. In State
47 Id. at 342, 28 N.E. at 963.
4 8 Commonwealth v. Simmons, cited note 31 supra
at 401, 65 A.2d at 358.
41 State v. White, cited note 4 supra at 183, 142
A.2d at 79 (concurring opinion).
v. Henryw° the court held that it was error not to
permit the defense to introduce evidence that the
accused's mother died when the defendant was
four years old and that an aunt had taken care of
her until she was fourteen; that the child ran away
from home because her father was cruel to her;
that she married at an early age and subsequently
lived as a lewd woman; in short, that she was a
child of misfortune and a victim of circumstances.
In State v. Owen 5' the offer of proof was that the
defendant's mother was a full-blooded American
Indian; she died when the defendant was six years
old and he had no real home life in the ordinary
meaning of the term; he lived from time to time
with his sister and other relatives; he had to pro-
vide for himself since the age of fourteen; he
learned the foundary moulding trade and was so
occupied until two weeks before the homicide.
In State v. Mount52 the defense offered to show that
the accused was five years old when his father
entered the army; that his mother then took up
with a paramour and lived in open adultery; that
at one time he was placed in an orphanage; when
he was sixteen he was sent to live with his father
who was then living with another woman and that
the father was "'a man of loose morals, who
flaunted his immorality in the presence of the
boy.'"
Other offers have been more limited in scope.
Courts have held that evidence may be introduced
showing mental deficiency short of legal insanity,n
intoxication,M war records, 5 prior ill feeling be-
tween the accused and the deceased, 56 and cir-
cumstances aggravating to the defendant such as
statements of the deceased reflecting upon the
chastity of the defendant's daughter, 7 and that
the deceased was sexually abusing his wife, the
50 Cited note 41 supra.51 Ibid.
m'Ibid.
"E.g., Commonwealth v. Stabinsky, cited note 31
supra; Miller v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 435, 255
S.W. 96 (1923); cf. Commonwealth v. Elliott, cited note
31 supra at 75, 89 A.2d at 785: "Mental deficiency is a
fact which always should be ... taken into considera-
tion in determining and fixing the penalty or sentence."
4 Harris v. Commonwealth, cited note 41 supra;
Commonwealth v. Simmons, cited note 31 supra.
55 State v. Owen, cited note 41 supra.
6 State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475(1947); Nowacryk v. People, cited note 41 supra;
Fields v. State, cited note 41 supra.
5 Kiersey v. State, cited note 41 supra; cf. Anthony
v. State, cited note 7 supra (The appellate court modi-
fied the sentence on the ground that the conduct of the
wife (the victim) in running around, which would, as
the defendant feared, lead to the immorality of the
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sister of the accused.5 In other situations courts
have indicated that age59 and drug addiction"
were proper considerations on the issue of punish-
ment. In aggravation of punishment, the state
has been permitted to show the circumstances of
the crime even though a plea of guilty has been
entered," bad character, 2 past criminal convictions,
and prison status at the time of the offense.3
Three principal arguments have been advanced
against the introduction of background evidence:
(1) the evidence is irrelevant to the case because
the issue is guilt or innocence;" (2) there are no
limits to this type of evidence-it will submerge
the trial in myriad collateral issues; (3) contrary
to the intentions of its adherents, adoption of the
rule admitting background evidence will result in
the introduction of evidence extremely prejudicial
to the defendant on the issue of guilt.
The first argument is plainly spurious. It is
quite dear that in a great many murder trials the
only issue is punishment. This will arise when the
jury is required to fix the penalty on a guilty plea. 65
It also occurs quite frequently in states where the
court may refuse, or is required to refuse to accept
a guilty plea;6G the trial then proceeds formally
daughter, was provocation, while not sufficient to
justify the homicide, at least sufficient basis for holding
the imposition by the jury of the death penalty an
abuse of discretion.).
Is Commonwealth v. Williams, cited note 33 supra.
59 People v. Ray, 172 Misc. 1004, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 224
(Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1065, 22 N.Y.S.
2d 119 (App. Div.), app. dismissed, 282 N.Y. 680,
26 N.E.2d 811 (1940); Ridge v. State, 28 Okla. Cr.
150, 229 Pac. 649 (1949); Commonwealth v. Zietz,
364 Pa. 294, 72 A. 2d 282 (1950).
60 Swartz v. State, 118 Neb. 591, 225 N.W. 766(1929).
61 State v. Brown, cited note 41 sopra.
2 See State v. Owen, cited note 41 supra (dictum).
3 See Prather v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 327, 170 Pac.
1176 (1918).
" See, e.g., Ashbrook v. State, cited note 10 supra;
Campbell v. Territory, cited note 41 supra; State v.
James, 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 At. 553 (E. & A. 1921).
65 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, §317 (1940); Asic.
STAT. ANN. §43: 2108 (1947) (Carson v. State, 198
Ark. 112, 128 S.W.2d 373 (1939); Scarber v. State, -
Ark. -, 291 S.W.2d 241 (1956)); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§39-2404, 2406 (1955) (Betts v. State, 189 Tenn. 30,
222 S.W.2d 190 (1946)); State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383,
12 P.2d 1110 (1932) ("The right to a trial on the issue
of guilt or innocence may be waived by a plea of guilt,
which leaves only the question of punishment to be
decided by the jury."). In New Hampshire, it is optional
with the court. See N. H. Ray. LAws c. 585.5 (1955).60 Required to refuse plea: See, e.g., HAwAII REv.
LAWS §291-4 (1955) ("A plea of guilty to a charge of
murder in the first degree shall not be received and if
such plea is offered it shall be disregarded by the court,
and a jury shall determine the guilt or innocence of
and the defendant waits for his opportunity to
admit his guilt and plead for mercy.67 And even
in the situation where guilt is at issue, punishment
is not only relevant, but perhaps even uppermost
in the defendant's mind. In this situation, the
choice of whether to plead for mercy, with the
possibility of compromising the accused's case on
guilt, is a decision that ought to be made by de-
fense counsel. It should not be decided beforehand
by a rule of law.
The second argument is more serious. It is based
on the fear that the trial will be distracted by the
various details of the accused's life. It is analogous
to the policy reasons behind the rule that character
be evidenced by reputation rather than specific
instances of conduct.68 A typical statement of the
argument for disallowing background evidence on
this ground runs as follows: "Were the rule other-
wise, it is quite evident that first-degree murder
trials might well become hopelessly mired in auto-
biographical sketches and psychosociological de-
bates, submerging the true issue of guilt or in-
nocence."6 9 As stated above, background evidence
has ranged over a broad area. And the standards
contained in the decisions which have authorized
the evidence state only the vaguest limits. For
example, Justice Burling described the majority
rule, and its implications, in State v. Mount, as
follows:
"It is said that evidence relevant to punish-
ment should be kept within 'reasonable bounds.'
the defendant."); LA. Rav. STAT. tit. 15: 262 (1951);
N. Y. CODE Or Cpmi. PRoc. §332 (In New York thejury recommendation is not binding on the trial court.
See statute cited note 6 supra; Williams v. People,
337 U. S. 241 (1949)); TEx. CODE OP Cia.. Ppoc.
arts. 502, 517 (Vernon 1954) (Ex parte Stewart, 155
Tex. Cr. R. 479, 236 S.W. 2d 799 (1951)). Discretionary:
See, e.g., KY. R . STAT. §1.130 (1948); N. J. STAT.
AvN. tit. 2A, c. 113, §§2, 4 (1953) (The defendant
cannot plead guilty, but can plead non vult or nolo
contendere, which, if accepted, carries an automatic
sentence of life imprisonment. Acceptance of such a
plea is discretionary with the court, see, e.g., State v.
Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 Atl. 385 (E. & A. 1919),
and the practice is that if the prosecution feels that the
death penalty is warranted, the court will not accept
the plea, see State v. White, cited note 4 supra at 186,
142 A.2d at 81 (concurring opinion)); UTAR CODE
ANN. §77-24-7 (1953) (In Utah the jury recommenda-
tion is not binding on the court. See statute cited note
6 supra.); Compare State v. Hardy, 339 Mo. 897, 98
S.W.2d 593 (1939) (discretionary) with In re Opinion
of the judges, 87 Okla. Cr. 297. 197 P.2d 629 (1948)
(a common-law right to plead guity).
67 See Francis, J., in State v. White, supra.
61 See McCoRmcK, op. cit. supra note 2 at 334.




This standard has sufficient vagueness to insure
that we will be plagued with the problem for
some time to come.
"When the issue is life or death, the scope of
relevant proof is assuredly broad. Does the stand-
ard of reasonable bounds import the notion
that some evidence, although relevant and not
unduly cumulative, can nevertheless be ex-
cluded in the discretion of the trial court? If not,
then the reasonable bounds referred to are as
broad as the issue to which the proofs are ad-
dressed."70
The problem of limiting the scope of background
evidence does not appear to be difficult in cases
like Fields, Fletcher, and Nowarcryk since the rel-
evancy would be defined by the purpose of proving
the turbulent character of the deceased and the
circumstances surrounding the homicide. In cases
where the object is to prove intoxication, drug
addiction, or perhaps mental deficiency short of
legal insanity,7' the scope of the relevancy, while
somewhat broader, also appears to have limits.
In cases like Henry, Owen, and Mount, however,
the purpose was to show anything in the general
background of the accused that might strike a
sympathetic response on the part of the jury. In
this type of case, even though the permissible
range of inquiry on the issue of punishment is
necessarily broad, the court will have to draw the
line at the point where the probative value of the
evidence is outweighed by the cost of undue con-
sumption of time or the threat of confusion of
issues, prejudice, or surprise.7 2 This is the balancing
and line-drawing approach used when the courts
70 Cited note 10 supra at 223, 152 A. 2d at 357 (con-
curring opinion). Despite the opinion of the draftsman
of the California statute that the scope of the admissi-
ble evidence under that statute is as broad as the pre-
sentence and probation reports, letter to'author from
Hon. Roy A. Gustafson, District Attorney, Ventura
County, California, dated April 7, 1960, the courts of
that state have considerably narrowed the scope of the
evidence. See People v. Moya,-Cal. 2d-,350P.2d 112,
3 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1960); People v. Baldonado, -Cal.
2d -, 350 P. 2d 112, 3 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960); People
v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959), discussed
in note 72 infra. Compare also People v. Love, -Cal.
2d-, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960), discussed
in text at note 75 infra. The Pennsylvania courts will
be faced with the same problem since their statutory
language provides no guides as to the scope of the ad-
missible evidence at the second hearing. See statute
cited note 8 supra.
71 But see State v. Perry, cited note 19 supra, where
evidence of mental deficiency short of legal insanity
ranged far over the defendant's life. See note 20 supra.72 Cf. McCoamcK, op. cit. supra note 2 at 319. In
People v. Purvis, cited note 70, supra, the defendant
are faced with cumulative testimony.73 The court
decides when the parties have sufficiently made
their point and when the additional benefits to be
gained will be insignificant when compared to the
disadvantages of the continued introduction of the
evidence. 74
had been convicted of murder in the second degree.
While on parole he committed a second homicide and
was convicted of murder in the first degree. During the
second hearing on penalty, it was held prejudicial
error to admit records of criminals who had been re-
leased or paroled after two or more convictions. Parole
records of individuals convicted of felonies other than
murder are inadmissible in the penalty trial of a de-
fendant found guilty of murder. People v. Baldonado,
cited note 70 supra. In People v. Moya, cited note 70
supra, at the penalty trial, it was held proper to exclude
four tape recordings of defendant's asserted religious
conversion after defendant himself had already testified
as to his remorse and beliefs at the time of the taped
conversations.
71 See, e.g., State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d
761 (1957).74 It may be argued that pre-sentence reports could
be the method for presenting background evidence to
the jury. However, it is usually assumed that witnesses
are the proper vehicles. See, e.g., People v. Perry, cited
note 19 supra (psychologists; father); State v. Henry,
cited note 41 supra (defendant; aunt); State v. Schlaps,
cited note 40 supra (mother; school teacher). The
California statute has been construed to authorize the
use of competent evidence only, see People v. Purvis,
cited note 70, supra; cf. People v. Green, 47 Cal.2d
209, 302 P.2d 307 (1956), but the Model Penal Code
authorizes the use of hearsay if there is fair opportunity
to rebut it, see A. L. I., MODEL PENAL CODE, cited
note 9 supra. If the defendants can still use witnesses
to present their story, the problem of limiting the scope
of the evidence remains unsolved. It would be un-
desirable to use the pre-sentence reports as the only
source of background evidence. First, they are replete
with opinions, rumors, and reports of persons whom
the probation officer has sought out; indeed, this is the
officer's duty. Such people range from prison doctors to
known enemies of the accused, and it is difficult to see
how the defendant can test their statements. See, e.g.,
Williams v. People, cited note 66 supra; Note, 49
CoLum. L. Rv. 567 (1949). In addition, there is
serious doubt as to the technical and professional com-
petency of the reports. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 379
Ill. 323, 140 N.E.2d 730 (1942). See generally RUrn,
CRnmr AND JuvENaLE DEINQQENCY 187 (1958). Along
with questions of fairness and due process, those who
argue in favor of permitting the accused to have a
hearing on the pre-sentence report, do so on the ground
that the reports often lack competency and contain
rumor and gossip. See, e.g., RuBIx, op. cit. supra;
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility,
65 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1292 (1952); Note, supra;
Williams v. People, supra. The pre-sentence reports
that the author has examined contain both of these
faults. Finally, in their present form, the reports deal
extensively with the criminal background of the defend-
ant. For objections to the use of this information in
the single-verdict states, see text at note 76 infra. The
courts could exclude the portions of the reports dealing
with past criminal behavior, but this would cut out
perhaps the most valuable thing in the reports-the
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Similarly, evidence introduced on the issue of
punishment may be inflammatory. Even though
the jury, on this question, has wide discretionary
powers, the determination of the issue of penalty
must be a rational one. The probative value of the
evidence must be weighed against its inflammatory
effect, and it must be excluded if it serves primarily
to inflame the passions of the jury without further-
ing the purposes of criminal punishment, or, even
if relevant to the purposes of punishment, it must
still be excluded if it can be presented effectively
in a non or less inflammatory manner. In a recent
California case,7" evidence was introduced at the
second hearing for the sole purpose of showing
that the victim died in unusual pain. This was held
to be prejudicial error on the ground that there
was no claim that the pain was intentionally in-
flicted, and pain unintentionally inflicted is rele-
vant only to the extent that retribution for the
evil done by the criminal is a primary objective
of the criminal law, a doubtful proposition in
California. Furthermore, reasoned the court, even
if pain was relevant, it was testified to by a doctor,
and there was no need to employ the dramatic
techniques involved-a photograph showing not
the wound, but the expression of the face in death,
and a tape recording of the failing voice and groans
of the dying victim.
The third argument focuses its attention on the
situation where the defendant has a prior criminal
record and draws its support from the Pennsyl-
vania experience. If the jury is to know "what
manner of man it is upon whom they are being
asked to impose sentence," 76 then the jury must
have before it the complete background of the
accused. This is the function of the pre-sentence
report in the non-capital case. The reports not
only cover the early environment, religious train-
ing, schooling, work record and the like, but also
the criminal history of the accused including ar-
rests, indictments, convictions, and conduct in
prison.7 7 The jury in the capital case performs -the
same function as the sentencing judge in the non-
capital case; therefore the jury should have the
same background information. "Surely it cannot
be suggested that the truth in relation to the
results of medical and probationary examinations while
in prison.
5 People v. Love, -Cal. 2d-, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 665 (1960).
76 Commonwealth v. Simmons, cited note 31 supra
at 401, 65 A.2d at 358.
7 Francis, J., quoted in text at note 49 supra.
question of punishment travels a one-way street."7 8
The logic of this argument is unassailable, and
indeed, this is apparently the position of the Amer-
ican Law Institute's Model Penal Code,79 and was
thought to be the position of the legislative solu-
tion in California."
Under this approach the Pennsylvania courts
had in effect wiped out the rule which disallows
the state to introduce initially any kind of evi-
dence of bad character."' Evidence of bad char-
acter, including not only prior convictions, but
also evidence of reputation,n is excluded not be-
cause it lacks relevancy; to the contrary, it proves
too much."[Tlhere is no doubt that conduct is
relevant to character. An assault is relevant to
indicate a violent character; a fraud is relevant to
indicate a dishonest character."" It is because of
the danger of destructive prejudice that the ex-
clusionary rule applies." "The deep tendency of
human nature to punish not because our victim
is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and
may as well be condemned now that he is caught,
is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with
any jury, in or out of court."8 5 It is not surprising
that the Pennsylvania rule provoked such
bitter dissent, even to the point where three judges
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
characterized it as "so gross" as to amount to a
denial of due process.86 Chief Justice Jones, dissent-
ing in Commonwealth v. DePofi,s' described the
practice as follows:
"The thing could, and no doubt has, actually
worked out in a truly shocking fashion. It is
not beyond the range of possibility that where,
upon a trial for murder, the defendant's guilt
is doubtful... the balance may be tilted in
favor of a conviction because of... the evidence
of the defendant's prior criminal record. If
anyone think the possibility overdrawn, see
observation by a Pennsylvania assistant district
attorney in his complaint against the Act of 1947
78 State v. Mount, cited note 10 supra at 223, 152
A. 2d at 358 (concurring opinion).
79 See A. L. I., MODEL PENaL CODE, cited note 9
supra.
80 See notes 70 and 72 supra.
81 See MCCOPMcK, op. cit. supra note 2 at 327.
12 See Martin v. People, 114 Colo. 120, 162 P.2d
597 (1945); McCoMeK, op. cit. supra at 327.
83 3 WimmoRs, op. cit. supra note 41 at 549.
14 See 1 id. §57. Confusion of issues and unfair sur-
prise are additional reasons for the exclusionary rule.85 bid.86 Biggs, Hastie, McLaughlin, J. J., in United States
v. Price, cited note 35 supra.
Cited note 35 supra.
JOEL F. HANDLER
... where he says. . .'Following the passage
of the 1947 amendment ... I have seen habitual
criminals set free because the jurors had no
knowledge of the defendant's criminal rec-
ords.' ,,ss
The policy considerations behind the rule dis-
allowing the introduction of evidence of bad char-
acter in the state's case-in-chief apply with equal
force to the question of background evidence on
the issue of punishment. The Pennsylvania courts
mistakenly assumed that the question was one of
relevancy. But evidence of bad character is rele-
vant to the issue of guilt as well as to the issue of
punishment. In the single-verdict states the danger
of prejudice is present in both situations, and if the
jury cannot be trusted in the former, there is no
basis for assuming a different conclusion in the
latter. It cannot be denied that on the question of
punishment a jury should know the complete
background of the defendant, but here as in other
criminal proceedings, the rules of relevancy must
give way to more crucial competing considerations.
The same policy considerations apply to the
problem of what type of background evidence the
state may use in rebutting mitigating evidence.
Absent the question of background evidence, in
the standard criminal situation, if the defense
introduces evidence of reputation of good char-
acter, the state, in addition to producing its own
witnesses to testify as to evidence of bad reputa-
tion, may ask the defense witness whether he has
heard that the defendant has committed particu-
lar criminal acts inconsistent with the reputation
sworn to.' 9 The state may question the defense
witness as to indictments, arrests, convictions, and
imprisonment.9° This rule has been criticized not
only because it tends to nullify the policy of the
rule prohibiting evidence of bad character in the
state's case-in-chief, but also because it comes in
by way of hearsay and it leaves the accused no
means of defending himself by a denial or explana-
tion.9' As justification it has been said that this is
"the price a defendant must pay for attempting to
prove his good name.... [I]t subjects his proofs to
tests of credibility designed. to prevent him from
profiting by a mere parade of partisans."12
Persuasive arguments have been raised that it
8 Id. at 251, 66 A.2d at 659. The reference is to
McClellan, cited note 35 supra.
89 See McCo.s.cIC, op. cit. supra note 2 at 335.90 Ibid.
91 See 3 WIGuoRE, op. cit. supra note 41, §988.
4 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479
(1948).
is unjust and illogical to impose this price upon an
accused with a spotty record should he deem it
necessary to rebut the state's case on guilt by
evidence of his good character.93 In the area of
background evidence there are additional con-
siderations against the imposition of this choice.
The statutes investing the jury with the power to
decide the alternate penalty to death were passed
as part of the swing away from capital punish-
ment.94 They were designed to prevent jury nullifi-
cation95 and were an expression on the part of the
legislature that different degrees of moral turpitude
deserved different punishments.96 It was a recogni-
tion that in the capital as well as the non-capital
case the punishment must fit the offender as well
as the offense. They were passed in response to the
ethical and humanitarian arguments against capi-
tal punishment, and viewed in that light, they
were ameliorating.97 It has been persuasively
pointed out that if the jury is to fulfill the purposes
of the statutes, it must have before it the type of
evidence that the sentencing court has in the
non-capital case; even the opponents to back-
ground evidence concede this.98 The considerations,
then, on the issue of punishment are broader than
the defendant's interest in deciding whether to
open the door on character evidence. The con-
siderations include the community's interest in
not having murder penalties decided in the dark.
The policy of the statutes is to have the defendant
93 See Rutledge, J., dissenting in Michelson v. United
States, supra at 488.
9 See Frankfurter, J., concurring in Andres v.
United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Thompson, cited note 32 supra at 410, 133
A.2d at 222 (dissenting opinion); --Su=rLA'D &
CEssE , PRINCnLES OF CRIUMNOLoGY 263 (5th ed.
1955); Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital
Punishment in the United States, 60 Am. L. REv. 905,
908 (1926).
95 See Frankfurter, J., supra; State v. Molnar, 133
N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d 197, 202 (E. & A. 1945); Com-
monwealth v. Parker, cited note 32 supra at 152, 143
Aft. at 906-07; Note, Statutes Authorizing Assessment
of Punishment by the Jury, 27 HIxv. L. RFv. 169
(1913).
96 See Frankfurter, J., supra at 753; Calton v. Utah,
130 U. S. 83, 86-87 (1889).
9 See Frankfurter, J., supra. Thus, in California,
where the danger of prejudice on the question of guilt
has been removed, it- is apparently felt that the un-
restricted use of prior criminal records will be too harsh
on the defendant. See footnote 72 supra.
98 See, e.g., State v. Mount, cited note 10 supra at
221, 152 A. 2d at 356. With the exception of those who
oppose the introduction of background evidence be-
cause it is not relevant, the principal objections are
based on the grounds that it is incapable of being limited
and that it will result in prejudice.
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speak. The effect of allowing the state to rebut by
the -use of specific instances of criminal behavior is
to deter the defense from presenting background
information. This will not only prejudice the
defendant, but will also contradict the legislative
purpose.
This is not to say that the state should be fore-
closed from rebutting mitigating evidence. The
state may cross-examine defense witnesses as to
their qualifications to speak concerning the history
of the defendant; the state may introduce counter-
vailing evidence on matters other than criminal
behavior; and, under existing rules, the state may
introduce evidence of bad reputation." But the
state should not be able to introduce evidence of
prior criminal conduct, whether it be arrest, in-
dictment, conviction, or imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
Except for the "single-issue" adherents, all are
agreed that background evidence should be pre-
sented to the jury in the states where the jury must
decide the penalty for first-degree murder. Those
who oppose the introduction of the evidence do so
on the ground that it will either submerge the
1 See McComncK, op. ciL. supra note 2 at 337; cf.
Rutledge, J., dissenting in Michelson v. United States,
cited note 93 supra at 496.
trial into collateral issues or will unduly prejudice
the defendant on the issue of guilt. These diffi-
culties could be avoided if the trial were separated
into two distinct hearings, which is the California
and Pennsylvania practice, and which has been
adopted by the American Law Institute in its
Model Penal Code. In the states where the jury
must decide guilt and punishment in a single ver-
dict, rational decisions on the issue of punishment
can still be reached without sacrificing the orderli-
ness of the trial or basic fairness to the defendant.
The problem of limiting the seemingly endless
scope of the evidence can be entrusted to the dis-
cretion of the trial court. While this solution is
vague, it seems to be the best available in view of
the variant circumstances of each case, and is the
method used to adjust competing interests in other
areas of the law of evidence. The problem of
prejudice caused by the introduction of evidence
of prior criminal history raises considerations not
different from those concerning the introduction of
character evidence on the issue of guilt or inno-
cence, with the exception that the prosecution
should be further limited in the manner in which
it may rebut mitigating evidence. This will en-
courage the presentation of background informa-
tion, which is in accord with the statutory policy,
and, at the same time, prevent convictions based
upon the bad-man theory.
